The Untouchable Executive Authority: Trump and The Section 232 Tariffs on Steel and Aluminum by Kim, Arim Jenny
University of Miami Business Law Review 
Volume 28 
Issue 1 Winter 2019 Article 7 
The Untouchable Executive Authority: Trump and The Section 232 
Tariffs on Steel and Aluminum 
Arim Jenny Kim 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umblr 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, International Trade Law 
Commons, and the President/Executive Department Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Arim Jenny Kim, The Untouchable Executive Authority: Trump and The Section 232 Tariffs on Steel and 
Aluminum, 28 U. Miami Bus. L. Rev. 176 () 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umblr/vol28/iss1/7 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by University of Miami School of Law Institutional 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Business Law Review by an authorized editor 




The Untouchable Executive Authority: 
Trump and The Section 232 Tariffs on Steel 
and Aluminum 
Arim Jenny Kim* 
In 2018, President Trump championed his way through the 
imposition of the Section 232 Tariffs—a heavy tax on various 
imports, including steel and aluminum—by broadcasting a 
supposedly-imminent threat to the U.S. national security. This 
plea, however, has been criticized as a veil for President Trump’s 
economic protectionism policy. Meanwhile, others have 
questioned the constitutionality of the statute creating the 
President’s authority to impose these tariffs in the first place. This 
Comment explores the issues arising from President Trump’s 
Section 232 Tariffs on steel and aluminum: (1) the validity and 
justiciability of President Trump’s actions under Section 232 of 
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, and (2) the constitutionality of 
Section 232. 
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INTRODUCTION 
President Donald J. Trump, an advocate of tariffs, has upended the 
traditional U.S. trade policy as evidenced by his recent actions.1 Tariffs—
taxes on imports—are a method of safeguarding a country’s domestic 
industries as a form of economic and trade protectionism.2 By taxing 
imported foreign goods, tariffs raise the price of imports for domestic 
consumers and limit domestic manufacturers’ competition with foreign 
products.3  
The United States once revered a policy of economic protectionism, 
which supported the growth of American businesses, and successfully 
enacted tariffs to strengthen its economy during the Great Depression.4 
Nevertheless, this policy was short-lived in the United States due to the 
diplomatic frictions that resulted from tariffs.5  
After World War II, the United States changed its course of trade and 
adopted a primarily neoliberal trade policy, which promotes open markets 
and free trade, that resulted in the international growth of American 
businesses.6 Since the adoption of neoliberalism, tariffs have been 
imposed conservatively around the world due to what has become 
generally accepted as their irreparable economic, diplomatic, and legal 
 
1 See Chad P. Brown & Melina Kolb, Trump’s Trade War Timeline: An Up-to-Date 
Guide, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (Aug. 23, 2019), https://piie.com/blogs/trade-
investment-policy-watch/trump-trade-war-china-date-guide. 
2 See Kimberly Amadeo, Trade Protectionism Methods With Examples, Pros, and 
Cons: Why Protectionism Feels So Good But Is So Wrong, THE BALANCE (Jul. 10, 2019), 
https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-trade-protectionism-3305896.  
3  See id.  
4  See id.; see e.g., Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. 71–361, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 
590 (1930) (codified as amended 19 U.S.C. ch. 4).  
5  See Arthur MacEwan, The Neoliberal Disorder: The Inconsistencies of Trade Policy, 
THE NORTH AMERICAN CONGRESS ON LATIN AMERICA (Sept. 25, 2007), 
https://nacla.org/article/neoliberal-disorder-inconsistencies-trade-policy; Amadeo, supra 
note 1.  
6  See MacEwan, supra note 4.  
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harms.7 Under the Trump Administration, however, the fate of American 
neoliberalism is uncertain as the White House retrogrades through the 
history of trade policies by embracing tariffs once again.8 
Since 2018, President Trump has applied various tariffs by 
proclaiming foreign imports as national security threats.9 For example, 
pursuant to Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (“Section 
232”),10 the Department of Commerce (the “DoC”) conducted 
investigations on the steel and aluminum industry and concluded that 
imported steel and aluminum “threaten to impair national security.”11 
Thereafter, President Trump took action “to protect America”12 by 
imposing the Section 232 Tariffs: a 25 percent tariff on imported steels on 
March 8, 2018,13 and a 10 percent tariff on imported aluminums on March 
15, 2018.14 The President portrayed these tariffs as an American victory 
against countries attempting to export into the United States by 
characterizing tariffs as “a lot of money coming into the coffers of the 
United States of America.”15  
 
7  See S.K., Why Tariffs Are Bad Taxes, THE ECONOMIST (July 31, 2018), 
https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2018/07/31/why-tariffs-are-bad-
taxes.  
8  See Mehdi Noorbaksh, The Fate of Neoliberalism Under Trump, FAIR OBSERVER (Jan. 
17, 2017), https://www.fairobserver.com/region/north_america/neoliberalism-donald-
trump-united-states-america-news-43540/. 
9  See Brown & Kolb, supra note 1.  
10  19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(1)(A) (1962).  
11  Shannon Togawa Mercer & Matthew Kahn, America Trades Down: The Legal 
Consequences of President Trump’s Tariffs, LAWFARE (Mar. 13, 2018), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/america-trades-down-legal-consequences-president-
trumps-tariffs.  
12  PRESS RELEASE, THE WHITE HOUSE, WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW: SECTION 232 
INVESTIGATIONS AND TARIFFS (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/need-know-section-232-investigations-tariffs/. 
13  Although the DoC recommended a 24 percent tariff on steel, President Trump 
increased the number to 25 percent because a round number “sounded better” to him. 
Jonathan Swan, Inside the White House Trade Fights, AXIOS (Feb. 25, 2018), 
https://www.axios.com/inside-the-white-house-trade-fights-1519601322-5de818bf-4787-
42a5-9e7e-f780f4e2ebef.html.  
14  See Scott Horsley, Trump Formally Orders Tariffs on Steel and Aluminum Imports, 
NPR (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/03/08/591744195/trump-expected-to-
formally-order-tariffs-on-steel-aluminum-imports; see also Adjusting Imports of 
Aluminum Into the United States, 83 Fed. Reg. 11619 (Mar. 15, 2018); Adjusting Imports 
of Steel Into the United States, 83 Fed. Reg. 11625 (Mar. 8, 2018).  
15  Peter Coy, The Real Pain From Trump’s Tariffs Trickles Down to Consumers, 
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-
28/who-pays-for-trump-s-tariffs.  
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Similarly, in January 2018, President Trump levied safeguard tariffs 
on imported residential washing machines and solar panels.16 This action 
was premised on Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 examination by the 
United States International Trade Commission, which concluded that 
“increased foreign imports of washers and solar panels and modules are a 
substantial cause of serious injury to domestic manufacturers.”17 
Moreover, on March 22, 2018, the Office of the United States Trade 
Representative (the “USTR”) released a report from its investigation under 
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, which found that China’s trade 
practices related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and 
innovation were unreasonable and discriminatory.18 As a result of the 
Section 301 examination, a tariff-tug-of-war between the United States 
and China has ensued, as both countries have taken turns increasing their 
respective rates on tariffs and quotas on a wide range of consumer goods.19  
Although President Trump has justified the tariffs by characterizing 
them as necessities in response to national security threats, some 
constituencies have criticized the President’s actions.20 Many scholars fear 
that the retaliation by trading partners, which may issue reciprocal tariffs 
and quotas on American goods, could result in a full-blown trade war that 
destroys the global economy.21 In response to critics’ fear and public 
 
16  See David J. Lynch, Trump Imposes Tariffs on Solar Panels and Washing Machines 




17  See Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, President Trump 
Approves Relief for U.S. Washing Machine and Solar Panel Cell Manufacturers (Jan. 22, 
2018), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-
releases/2018/january/president-trump-approves-relief-us; see also U.S. Int’l Trade 
Comm’n, Large Residential Washers – Investigation No. TA-201-076, Publication 4745 
(2017); U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells (Whether or not 
Partially or Fully Assembled into Other Products) – Investigation No. TA-201-75, 
Publication 4739 (2017).  
18  See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATION 
INTO CHINA’S ACTS, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES RELATED TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND INNOVATION UNDER SECTION 301 OF THE TRADE ACT OF 
1974 (2018); see also Brown & Kolb, supra note 1.  
19  See Brown & Kolb, supra note 1.  
20  See Shrutee Sarkar, Economists united: Trump Tariffs Won’t Help the Economy, 
REUTERS (Mar. 13, 2018, 8:32 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-economy-
poll/economists-united-trump-tariffs-wont-help-the-economy-idUSKCN1GQ02G.  
21  See id. (Economists have expressed their concern that “tariffs on steel and aluminum 
imports would lead to a wider trade war.” One economist expressed that “[i]t will be very 
surprising if there isn’t some measured retaliation overtime from major trading partners.”).  
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outcry against the Trump Administration’s use of tariffs,22 there have been 
judicial and congressional attempts to halt these tariffs and prohibit 
President Trump from imposing more.23 These efforts have not yet been 
unsuccessful, however, due to statutory provisions that provide the 
president with nearly exclusive power to control American trade policy.24 
This Comment questions and analyzes how the vital power to govern the 
American economy and its trade has been delegated to the Executive.  
Although the Trump Administration has begun to apply numerous 
special tariffs since 2018,25 this Comment solely focuses on the Section 
232 Tariffs on the steel and aluminum industry (the “Section 232 Tariffs”). 
Part I presents the legal background of Section 232 and the enactment of 
the Section 232 Tariffs. Part II investigates and analyzes the issues 
surrounding the justiciability of the Section 232 Tariffs, and the 
constitutionality of the statute. Part III introduces pending legislative bills 
relating to Section 232 (as of August 2019). Lastly, Part IV concludes with 
an outlook to the future of Section 232 and the inevitable consequences of 
the Section 232 Tariffs.  
I. THE SECTION 232 TARIFFS ON STEEL AND ALUMINUM  
A. Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 
Pursuant to Section 232, the Secretary of Commerce (the “Secretary”) 
may conduct a Section 232 investigation to “determine the effects on the 
national security of imports” upon a request for investigation from an 
interested party or a self-initiation by the Secretary.26 Within 270 days of 
the investigation, the Secretary is then required to provide the president 
with a report on the findings of the investigation—specifically, whether an 
item “is being imported into the United States in such quantities or under 
such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security.”27 
Thereafter, the president must conclude whether he or she concurs with 
the Secretary’s findings within 90 days of receiving the report.28  
If the president agrees with the findings, he or she has the power to 
“determine the nature and duration of the action that, in the judgment of 
 
22  E.g., Clark Packard & Megan Reiss, Steel Protectionism Won’t Protect National 
Security, LAWFARE (Jan. 12, 2018, 7:29 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/steel-
protectionism-wont-protect-national-security; Sarkar, supra note 20.  
23  See infra Part IV; see also Mercer & Kahn, supra note 11.  
24  See infra Part III.  
25  Brown & Kolb, supra note 1.  
26  19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(1)(A).  
27  Id. § 1862(b)(3)(A).  
28  Id. § 1862(c)(1).  
2019] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 181 
 
the [p]resident, must be taken to adjust the imports of the article and its 
derivatives so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national 
security.”29 In essence, the statute grants the president sole discretion to 
adjust imports in any way he or she dictates due to the lack of guidance 
and limitations on the methods of adjustment. In determining whether an 
import impairs the national security, however, Section 232(d) outlines the 
following factors to consider:  
domestic production needed for projected national 
defense requirements, the capacity of domestic industries 
to meet such requirements, existing and anticipated 
availabilities of the human resources, products, raw 
materials, and other supplies and services essential to the 
national defense, the requirements of growth of such 
industries and such supplies and services including the 
investment, exploration, and development necessary to 
assure such growth, and the importation of goods in terms 
of their quantities, availabilities, character, and use as 
those affect such industries and the capacity of the United 
States to meet national security requirements . . . [,] the 
close relation of the economic welfare of the Nation to our 
national security, . . . the impact of foreign competition on 
the economic welfare of individual domestic industries; 
and any substantial unemployment, decrease in revenues 
of government, loss of skills or investment, or other 
serious effects resulting from the displacement of any 
domestic products by excessive imports . . . .30 
Although Section 232(d) includes a suggestive list of elements that could 
potentially affect national security, the statute does not provide legislative 
or judicial remedy for the president’s actions taken against imports.31 
However, the statute does provide a special exception to petroleum 
products: any action “to adjust imports of petroleum or petroleum products 
shall cease to have force and effect upon the enactment of [Congress’s] 
disapproval resolution.”32  
Between Congress’s enactment of Section 232 in 1962 and President 
Trump’s inauguration in 2017, there were 26 Section 232 investigations.33 
 
29  Id. § 1862(c)(1)(A).  
30  Id. § 1862(d).  
31  See id.; see infra Part II.B.2.  
32  Id. § 1862(f)(1).  
33  See RACHEL F. FEFER & VIVIAN C. JONES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF10667, SECTION 
232 OF THE TRADE EXPANSION ACT OF 1962 (2018).  
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Of the 26 investigations, the DoC found that 62% of the time the subject 
of the investigations did not threaten national security.34 In fact, only five 
of those investigations resulted in presidential action, only two of which 
constituted legitimate executive action: an embargo on crude oil from Iran 
in 1979, and an embargo on crude oil from Libya in 1982.35 Of the other 
three instances, two actions were based on a pre-existing initiative that 
predated Section 232 and thus, did not raise executive power issues.36 The 
remaining action—President Carter’s action to impose a gasoline 
conservation fee on petroleum products—was held illegal in 1980 because 
the Trade Expansion Act “does not authorize the President to impose 
general controls on domestically produced goods.”37 Although “a 
regulation on imports may incidentally regulate domestic goods,” the 
District Court for the District Court of Columbia found that President 
Carter’s conservation fee had a greater impact on domestically produced 
oil than imported oil as it affected all gasoline sales, including domestic 
products.38 Furthermore, none of the five presidential actions constituted 
an increase of existing tariffs and quotas.   
B. The Enactment of the Section 232 Tariffs 
In April 2017, Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross initiated Section 
232 investigations to determine the effects of imported steel and aluminum 
on national security.39 Thereafter, in January 2018, the DoC submitted two 
reports (collectively, the “Section 232 Reports”) that outlined the 
Secretary’s findings and recommendations: The Effects of Imports of Steel 
on the National Security,40 and The Effects of Imports of Aluminum on the 
National Security.41  
 
34  These embargoes were later superseded by economic sanctions. RACHEL F. FEFER ET 
AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45249, SECTION 232 INVESTIGATIONS: OVERVIEW AND 
ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 3 (2019).  
35  See id. at 3–4.  
36  See FEFER & JONES, supra note 33.  
37  Indep. Gasoline Marketers Council, Inc. v. Duncan, 492 F. Supp. 614, 618 (D.D.C. 
1980); see also id. at 620 (“It is clear that Congress, not the President, must decide whether 
the imposition of a gasoline conservation fee is good policy.”).  
38  Id. at 618.  
39  See FEFER ET AL., supra note 34, at 5–6; David Lawder, U.S. Launches National 
Security Probe into Aluminum Imports, REUTERS (April 27, 2017, 10:06 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-aluminum/u-s-launches-national-security-
probe-into-aluminum-imports-idUSKBN17T044.  
40  U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, THE EFFECT OF IMPORTS OF STEEL ON THE NATIONAL 
SECURITY (2018) [hereinafter Steel Report].  
41  U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, THE EFFECT OF IMPORTS OF ALUMINUM ON THE NATIONAL 
SECURITY (2018) [hereinafter Aluminum Report].  
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The Section 232 Reports found that the importing rates and global 
overproduction of steel and aluminum threaten to impair national security 
and thus, recommended the strengthening of tariffs on these imports.42 The 
Secretary urged President Trump to limit these imports to promote 
American utilization of the domestic steel and aluminum industries, 
increase the availability of domestic production for national defense 
requirements, protect American economic welfare, and increase the 
employment rate.43 The Section 232 Reports also claimed that 
international suppliers may pose as threats by cutting supply off when the 
United States urgently requires those supplies, such as in wartime.44 By 
emphasizing the significance of these imports in protecting the nation’s 
economy and security, the Secretary “conclude[d] that the present 
quantities and circumstances of steel imports are ‘weakening our internal 
economy’ and threaten to impair the national security as defined in Section 
232.”45  
Upon receipt of the Section 232 Reports, President Trump 
subsequently imposed a 25 percent tariff on imported steel on March 8, 
2018,46 and a 10 percent tariff on imported aluminum on March 15, 2018.47 
The Section 232 Tariffs covered an estimated value of $48 billion in steel 
and aluminum imports, mostly from foreign exporters that are American 
allies.48 Initially, President Trump excluded only Canada and Mexico, 
which amounted to one-third of the covered imports valued at $15.3 
billion.49 However, President Trump established an exclusion process for 
trading partners to negotiate with the USTR and request for exemptions 
while permitting corporations to file separate petitions with the DoC to 
exclude specific products from the tariffs.50 Thus, more nations are now 
exempted by way of the exclusion process.51 
Since the levy of the Section 232 Tariffs, President Trump revised his 
proclamations multiple times to extend exemptions to certain countries 
while removing exemptions that were previously granted to others.52 
Despite the additional exemptions and amendments to the Section 232 
Tariffs, numerous trading partners have retaliated or threatened the United 
 
42  See Steel Report, supra note 40, at 2–5; Aluminum Report, supra note 41, at 23–62.  
43  See Steel Report, supra note 40, at 2–5; Aluminum Report, supra note 41, at 23–62.  
44  See Steel Report, supra note 40, at 2–5.  
45  Id. at 5.  
46  Proclamation No. 9705, 83 Fed. Reg. 11,625 (Mar. 8, 2018).  
47  Proclamation No. 9704, 83 Fed. Reg. 11,619 (Mar. 15, 2018).  
48  See Brown & Kolb, supra note 1, at 3.  
49  See id.; Proclamation No. 9705, 83 Fed. Reg. 11,627.  
50  See FEFER ET AL., supra note 34, at 7; see, e.g., 15 C.F.R. pt. 705 (2018).  
51  See Brown & Kolb, supra note 1, at 3.  
52  See Brown & Kolb, supra note 1; see, e.g., Proclamation No. 9711, 83 Fed. Reg. 
13,361, 13,363 (Mar. 22, 2018).  
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States with reciprocal tariffs and quotas on American products.53 In July 
2018, President Trump filed claims against these countries at the World 
Trade Organization to challenge their tariffs on American products; 
however, these claims have only exasperated the trade frictions.54  
C. Public Response to the Section 232 Tariffs 
Despite the DoC’s rationale for its finding that steel and aluminum 
imports threaten national security, the Department of Defense (the “DoD”) 
expressed its concern for “the [tariffs’] negative impact on [the American] 
key allies.”55 In its memorandum published in response to the Section 232 
Reports, the DoD stated that the steel and aluminum imports do not 
“impact the ability of DoD programs to acquire the steel and aluminum 
necessary to meet national defense requirements.”56 Furthermore, many 
economists and politicians have vocalized their doubt on Secretary Ross’s 
recommendations due to their fear for the “global trade war”57 and its 
eventual impacts on consumers, including the rise in the price of consumer 
goods.58 Various American companies have opined that tariffs function as 
a tax on American businesses and consumers, not on the exporting 
countries.59 Additionally, the findings of the 232 Reports have been 
criticized as a means for President Trump to opportunistically use national 
security as a veil for his economic protectionism policies.60  
 
53  See Brown & Kolb, supra note 1.  
54  See id.  
55  See Memorandum from the Sec’y of Defense with Response to Steel and Aluminum 
Policy Recommendations to the Sec’y of Commerce (2018) (on file with the U.S. Dep’t of 
Commerce).  
56  See id.  
57  Tariffs have reportedly caused major trade frictions between the United States and its 
trading partners. See e.g., A Quick Guide to the US-China Trade War, BBC (Dec. 12, 
2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-50784554 (In 18 months, “the US has 
imposed tariffs on more than $360bn . . . of Chinese goods, and China has retaliated with 
tariffs on more than $110bn of US products.”); Keith Johnson, U.S.-Europe Trade War 
Reerupts in London, FOREIGN POLICY (Dec. 3, 2019, 4:23 PM), 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/03/nato-trump-europe-trade-war-digital-tax-google/ 
(In response to the U.S.’s tariff on French luxury brands, France imposes a digital services 
tax on U.S. tech companies.); Ana Swanson, Trump Says U.S. Will Impose Metal Tariffs 
on Brazil and Argentina, NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 2, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/02/business/economy/trump-tariffs-brazil-argentina-
metal.html (President Trump announced to impose tariffs on Brazil and Argentina after 
accusing them of manipulating their currencies and hurting American farmers.). 
58 See, e.g., Packard & Reiss, supra note 22; Sarkar, supra note 20 (“The median 
probability of a recession in the coming year was 13 percent.”).  
59  Mark Niquette, Business Groups Line Up Behind Limits to Trump’s Tariff Powers, 
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-
04/business-groups-line-up-behind-limits-to-trump-s-tariff-powers.  
60  See Packard & Reiss, supra note 22.  
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II. THE UNTOUCHABLE EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY UNDER SECTION 
232 
A. The Validity and Justiciability of the Section 232 Tariffs 
The Constitution enshrines the doctrine of separation of powers and 
the system of checks and balances into the power-structure of the federal 
government.61 The federal government is comprised of three branches: (i) 
the Legislative Branch, which is composed of the House of 
Representatives and the Senate;62 (ii) the Executive Branch, which 
includes the President, the Vice-President, and the Departments;63 and (iii) 
the Judicial Branch, which is headed by the Supreme Court.64 These 
branches have distinct and limited authority as enumerated in separate 
Articles of the Constitution,65 which grant each branch the ability to check 
the actions of the others to prohibit inter-branch encroachment and abuse 
of power.66 
Accordingly, the Constitution provides Congress with enumerated 
legislative authority under Article I, including the power “to lay and 
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises”67 as well as the power “[t]o 
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.”68 The exclusivity of this 
authority, however, has been blurred throughout history as Congress has 
explicitly and implicitly relayed some of its authority to the president.69 
Although the delegations of authority may seem antithetical to the doctrine 
 
61  See generally T.J. Halstead, Cong. Research Serv., R44334, The Separation of Powers 
Doctrine: An Overview of Its Rationale and Application 10 (1999) (“While the 
Constitution provides separate institutions and bases of power, the structure does not 
insulate the branches from each other.”).  
62  U.S. Const. art. I.  
63  Id. art. II.  
64  Id. art. III.  
65  See id. art. I; Id. art. II; Id. art. III.  
66  See Halstead, supra note 61, at 10; Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConell, Due 
Process as Separation of Powers, 121 Yale L.J. 1672, 1781 (2012) (“The basic idea of due 
process . . .  was that the law of the land required each branch of government to operate in 
a distinctive manner . . . .”).  
67  U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 1.  
68  Id. art. I, §8, cl. 3; see also Kathleen Claussen, Trade War Battles: Congress 
Reconsiders Its Role, Lawfare (Aug. 5, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/trade-war-
battles-congress-reconsiders-its-role (“Congress has regularly empowered the executive to 
manage foreign commerce without the checks that it has accorded itself in other areas.”).  
69  E.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582 (1952) (“whether 
the President was acting within his constitutional power when he issued an order directing 
the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of and operate most of the Nation's steel 
mills.”); Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (whether President Clinton’s 
authority to cancel provisions in the Balanced Budget Act and the Taxpayer Relief Act of 
1997 was constitutional).  
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of separation of powers, the Supreme Court has held that Congress can 
delegate its authority to the Executive: 
When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied 
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its 
maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own 
right plus all that Congress can delegate. . . . [An action] 
executed by the President pursuant to an Act of Congress 
would be supported by the strongest of presumptions and 
the widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the 
burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who 
might attack it.70  
Accordingly, the president has the maximum level of authority when 
he or she acts pursuant to the delegated power from Congress, even if such 
prerogative is not enumerated in the Constitution.71 As such, because the 
executive action in adjusting imports is within the delegated authority 
under Section 232, “the Executive’s decisions in the sphere of 
international trade are reviewable only to determine whether the 
[p]resident’s action falls within his delegated authority, whether the 
statutory language has been properly construed, and whether the 
[p]resident’s action conforms with the relevant procedural 
requirements.”72 The authorization of power from Congress affords the 
president with a blanket protection from judicial review because “the 
[p]resident’s findings of fact and the motivations for his action are not 
subject to review.”73 Accordingly President Trump holds the maximum 
level of power to control and adjust imports—specifically, the authority to 
impose the Section 232 Tariffs on any import that he perceives as a threat 
to the United States.74 Moreover, Section 232 protects President Trump 
and the Section 232 Tariffs from judicial review unless there is evidence 
of the President’s misconstruction of Section 232.75  
 
70  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 635 (6-3 decision) (Jackson, J., 
concurring).  
71  See id.  
72  Florsheim Shoe Co., Div. of Interco, Inc. v. United States, 744 F.2d 787, 795 (Fed. 
Cir. 1984).  
73  Maple Leaf Fish Co. v. United States, 762 F.2d 86, 89 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“[T]he 
President’s findings of fact and the motivations for his action are not subject to review.”).  
74  See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 635.  
75  Because Section 232 serves as a direct constitutional authority for the imposition of 
the Section 232 Tariffs, “[the President’s] motives, his reasoning, his finding of facts 
requiring the action, and his judgment are immune from judicial scrutiny.” U.S. Cane Sugar 
Refiners’ Ass’n v. Block, 683 F.2d 399, 404 (C.C.P.A. 1982); see Severstal Exp. GmbH v. 
United States, No. 18-37, slip op. at 15–16 (U.S. Ct. Int’l Trade Apr. 5, 2018) (“To the 
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In Severstal Exp. GmbH v. United States, the U.S. Court of 
International Trade (the “CIT”) confronted the validity of President 
Trump’s Section 232 Tariffs: whether President Trump’s imposition of the 
Section 232 Tariffs exceeded his statutory authority by utilizing Section 
232 as a veil for economic protectionism.76 However, the court refused to 
discuss the validity of the tariffs because the court “lack[ed] the power to 
review the President’s lawful exercise of discretion.”77 Nevertheless, by 
distinguishing between the substance of the President’s exercise of 
discretion pursuant to a governing statute and his misinterpretation of such 
statute, the CIT held that “the court may review the executive’s actions for 
‘clear misconstruction’ of such limiting language.”78  
Because President Trump’s exercise of discretion was non-
justiciable,79 the Severstal court focused on whether Section 232 
authorized the President to impose the tariffs in response to an economic 
situation.80 The court found that Section 232 is comprised of broad and 
permissive language, which does not “foreclose[] the President from 
finding a threat to national security due to the overall economic situation 
of the steel industry.”81 According to the court, the factors outlined in 
Section 232(d) encompass economic factors, including any pretextual 
motives, such as President Trump’s attempt to use tariffs in trade 
negotiations to draw concessions from other countries and bolster his 
position in diplomatic conventions.82 Thus, the CIT held that President 
Trump’s determination and use of national security for economic 
reasons—even if, as a veil for economic policies—are valid exercise of 
power  because these economic rationales are consistent with Section 232 
executive authority.83  
Despite public criticism against President Trump’s use of Section 232, 
the Severstal court foreclosed any future possibilities to attack the 
executive actions relating to the Section 232 Tariffs.84 Thus, the American 
 
extent the court may review the action of the President, it is unlikely that the President 
exceeded his statutory authority.”).  
76  See Severstal Exp. GmbH, slip. op. at 5.  
77  Id.; see also Corus Group PLC v. ITC, 352 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  
78  Severstal Exp. GmbH, slip. op. at 16; see Maple Leaf Fish Co., 762 F.2d at 89 (“For 
a court to interpose, there has to be a clear misconstruction of the governing statute, a 
significant procedural violation, or action outside delegated authority.”).  
79  See Severstal Exp. GmbH, slip op. at 15–17.  
80  See id. at 15–16, 18, 21.  
81  Id. at 22.  
82  See id. at 21–22.  
83  See id. at 22.  
84  See id. at 22–23.  
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Institute for International Steel, Inc. (the “AIIS”),85 took a different 
approach to challenge the Section 232 Tariffs by asserting that Section 232 
improperly delegates the legislative authority to the President and thus, 
violates the Constitution.86 
B. The Constitutionality of Section 232 
Because President Trump’s levy of the Section 232 Tariffs is a non-
justiciable issue,87 the AIIS has challenged the constitutionality of Section 
232. The AIIS asserts that Section 232 unconstitutionally delegates 
Congress’s enumerated power to the President, thereby violating the 
doctrine of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances 
enshrined in the Constitution.88 However, the Supreme Court has held 
otherwise in Yakus v. United States: Nor does the doctrine of separation of 
powers deny to Congress power to direct that an administrative officer 
properly designated for that purpose have ample latitude within which he 
is to ascertain the conditions which Congress has made prerequisite to the 
operation of its legislative command.89  
i. The Intelligible Principle Test 
Arguably, Section 232 creates an imbalance of power delegated 
between Congress and the Executive. It raises issues of separation of 
powers and checks and balances by creating an executive power to “adjust 
the imports”90 in response to a national threat. Although Section 232’s 
delegation of power appears to be in conflict with the Constitution, the 
Supreme Court has held that a delegation of legislative power to the 
Executive is permitted as long as the statute provides an intelligible 
principle.91  
 
85  The American Institute for International Steel is a non-profit membership corporation 
that supports free trade of steel. On behalf of its 120 members, it brought action against the 
United States. About AIIS, AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STEEL, 
http://www.aiis.org/about/. 
86      See Complaint at 1, Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, No. 1:18-cv-00152 
(U.S. Ct. Int’l Trade Jun. 27, 2018).  
87  See Severstal Exp. GmbH, slip op. at 16–17.  
88  Complaint, supra note 86, at 5–8.  
89  Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1944).  
90  19 U.S.C. § 1862(c)(1)(B) (1962).  
91  See J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (“If 
Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or 
body authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a 
forbidden delegation of legislative power.”); see also Chapman & McConell, supra note 
66, at 1785 (“For much of our history, Congress and the Supreme Court operated on the 
loose but workable assumption that Congress could delegate legislative power – the power 
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In essence, if Congress delegates its authority to another branch of 
government and provides “an intelligible principle to which the person or 
body authorized to [act] is directed to conform, such legislative action is 
not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.”92 As such, a delegation 
of legislative power to the president is constitutional, if it does not leave 
“the expediency or just operation of such legislation” to the president’s 
determination and thus, “d[oes] not in any real sense invest the [p]resident 
with the power of legislation.”93 Furthermore, the intelligible principle test 
is satisfied “if Congress clearly delineates the general policy, the public 
agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of th[e] delegated 
authority.”94 The general policy and boundaries of delegated power can be 
determined by reviewing the “purpose of the Act, its factual background 
and the statutory context in which they appear.”95 
In American Institute for International Steel, Inc. v. United States,96 
the question before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (the 
“Federal Circuit”) is whether “Section 232 [is] facially unconstitutional on 
the ground that it does not impose any boundaries or limits on the 
President’s powers under it and therefore constitutes an improper 
delegation of legislative authority and violates the principles of separation 
of powers established by the Constitution.”97  
The Plaintiffs in American Institute for International Steel, Inc. 
initially contested the constitutionality of Section 232 before the CIT, 
where they asserted that the language of the statute is broad and overly 
permissive and thus, departs from an ordinary understanding and 
definition of national security as typically related to national defense and 
 
to make rules – to the executive so long as it provided an ‘intelligible principle’ to govern 
that discretion.”).  
92  J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co., 276 U.S. at 409.  
93  Id. at 410.  
94  Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372–73 (1989) (citing Am. Power & Light 
Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946)).  
95  Am. Power & Light Co., 329 U.S. at 104.  
96  On March 25, 2019, the Court of International Trade denied the Plaintiffs’ motion for 
summary judgment. Thereafter, the Plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of certiorari but the 
U.S. Supreme Court denied cert. As of August 25, 2019, the case is pending appeal at the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Alex Lawson, Bid to Limit Trump's Tariff 
Power Lands In Fed. Circ., LAW360 (Aug. 9, 2019), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1187365.  
97  Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants Am. Inst. For Int’l Steel, Inc., and Sim-Tex, LP, Kurt 
Orban Partners, LLC. at 2, Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, No. 19-1727 (Fed. 
Cir. Aug. 9, 2019) (The other issue is “Did the Court of International Trade erroneously 
conclude that Algonquin controls the outcome of this action?).  
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foreign relations.98 Moreover, the Plaintiffs claimed that Section 232 lacks 
limitations on the President’s interpretation of national security as it does 
not provide any import restrictions based on type or quantity, and is 
without tests to determine the veracity of potential threats.99 The CIT, 
however, rejected the Plaintiffs’ claims.100  
Contrary to the Plaintiffs’ claims in American Institute for 
International Steel, Inc. that Section 232 is an unconstitutional delegation 
of authority,101 the Supreme Court, in Federal Energy Administration, v. 
Algonquin SNG, Inc., held that Section 232 is a proper delegation of 
legislative power to the Executive because it “easily fulfills” the 
intelligible principle test.102 Indeed, as the Plaintiffs claim, the language of 
Section 232 indicates that President Trump is at liberty to declare almost 
all imports as a threat to the national security.103 However, the Supreme 
Court found that Section 232(d) provides broad yet detailed categories of 
factors to consider when determining the magnitude of a threat.104  
According to the Algonquin Court, Section 232 has specific 
preconditions that guide the president’s exercise of discretion and thus, 
satisfies the intelligible principle test.105 The Court stated that the president 
does not have complete freedom when enacting tariffs, because: (1) 
Section 232(b) permits an action after the president’s receipt of the Section 
232 report from the DoC; and (2) the president can act only when it is 
“necessary to adjust the imports of such article and its derivatives so that 
such imports will not threaten to impair the national security.”106 By 
finding these two factors as sufficient limitations on the president’s 
exercise of discretion, the Court held that Section 232 satisfies the 
 
98  See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 5, Am. 
Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, No. 1:18-cv-00152 (U.S. Ct. Int’l. Trade July 19, 
2018).  
99  See Complaint, supra note 86, at 5–8.  
100  See Am. Inst. for Int’l  Steel, Inc. v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 3d 1335, 1345 (Ct. 
Int’l Trade 2019).  
101  See Complaint, supra note 86, at 7, 12–16, 18–19.  
102  Fed. Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 558–60 (1928).  
103  See Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants Am. Inst. For Int’l Steel, Inc., and Sim-Tex, LP, 
Kurt Orban Partners, LLC., supra note 97, at 2 (“[T]he lack of any legislative boundaries 
in section 232 enables the President to do whatever he chooses regarding tariffs, quotas, or 
other restrictions on imports.”).  
104  See Severstal Exp. GmbH v. United States, No. 18-37, slip op. at 20 (U.S. Ct. Int’l 
Trade Apr. 5, 2018); see also Algonquin SNG., Inc., 426 U.S. at 559 (“[T]he leeway that 
[Section 232] gives the President in deciding what action to take in the event the 
preconditions are fulfilled is far from unbounded.”).  
105  See Algonquin SNG., Inc., 426 U.S. at 559–60; see also Severstal Exp. GmbH, slip op. 
at 22–23.  
106  Algonquin SNG., Inc., 426 U.S. at 559; see 19 U.S.C. § 1862(c)(1)(A)(ii) (1970); 
Severstal Exp. GmbH, slip op. at 22–23.  
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intelligible principle test.107 Moreover, despite the AIIS’s claim that the 
statute lacks clear guidelines, the Court concluded that there is no current 
law or case that outlines the degree of specificity for governing standards 
of delegated authority, or the need “to compel Congress to prescribe 
detailed rules.”108  
In addition to Section 232’s “clear preconditions to [p]residential 
action,”109 the Algonquin Court held that the statute properly delegates the 
legislative authority to the Executive because it outlines the general policy, 
the acting agency, and the boundaries of the delegated authority.110 
Furthermore, the Court refused to construe the statute narrowly “to avoid 
‘a serious question of unconstitutional delegation of legislative power’” 
because the standards of Section 232(b) are “clearly sufficient to meet any 
delegation doctrine attack.”111 Relying on Algonquin, the CIT rejected the 
Plaintiffs’ argument that Section 232 is without an intelligible principle.112 
As such, the Plaintiffs face a significant challenge to persuade the Federal 
Circuit to overturn the earlier ruling from Algonquin. 
Although the Supreme Court has held that Section 232 satisfies the 
intelligible principle test, the question remains whether the factors outlined 
in the statute suffice. The current language of Section 232 undeniably lack 
utility in judicial review because of the absence of specific rules and 
standards the president is required to follow when adjusting imports.113 
Thus, such lack of specificity forecloses the judicial power to enforce the 
boundaries of the law, which aims to closely adhere to the intention of 
Congress.114  
 
107  Algonquin SNG., Inc., 426 U.S. at 560.  
108  Id.  
109  Id. at 559. 
110  See id.; see also J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 408 (1928) 
(“The Congress may not delegate its purely legislative power to a commission, but, having 
laid down the general rules of action under which a commission shall proceed, it may 
require of that commission the application of such rules to particular situations and the 
investigation of facts, with a view to making orders in a particular matter within the rules 
laid down by the Congress.”); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372–73 (1989) 
(citing Am. Power & Light Co. v. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946)) (A 
statute is “constitutionally sufficient if Congress clearly delineates the general policy, the 
public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated authority.”). 
111  Algonquin SNG., Inc., 426 U.S. at 558–59.  
112  Am. Inst. for Int’l  Steel, Inc. v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 3d 1335, 1340 (Ct. Int’l 
Trade 2019).  
113  Response Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion 
for Judgment on the Pleadings and Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion 
for Summary Judgement at 20–21, Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, No. 1:18-
cv-00152 (Ct. Intl. Trade Oct. 5, 2018).  
114  See Chapman & McConell, supra note 66, at 1786 (“[T]here are no judicially 
manageable standards for determining ‘the permissible degree of policy judgment that can 
be left to those executing or applying the law.’”).  
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ii. The Lack of Judicial Review 
Procedural checks, such as judicial review, are generally employed to 
control and monitor various administrative agencies’ decision-making 
procedures.115 The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)116 governs 
federal agencies’ rulemaking procedures and provides standards of 
judicial review for agency misconduct.117 In theory, petitioners of the 
exclusion process and legal practitioners should be able to attack the 
validity of the Section 232 Tariffs under the APA as an alternative to 
challenging the constitutionality of the Section 232 Tariffs.118  
Using the APA as a vehicle to challenge the tariffs remains 
challenging, however, because the Supreme Court has held that the 
president does not constitute “an agency” for the purposes of the APA and, 
therefore, the president’s modification to tariffs and the corresponding 
presidential proclamations do not constitute “agency action.”119 Because 
the president is not subjected to the APA, any claims that attack the 
president’s lack of compliance with the APA and other governing statutes 
are moot.120 Thus, the Section 232 Tariffs are a by-product of President 
Trump’s unconstitutional “blank check” from Section 232 because they 
are not subjected to any legislative or judicial review.121 As such, the 
statute grants the president the sole power to take action on imports as a 
de facto agency of Congress; yet, the law fails to supply review as a  
necessary check on the executive action. 
Bound by Algonquin, the CIT did not find the lack of judicial review 
to be unconstitutional in American Institute for International Steel, Inc.122 
The CIT held that “presidential determinations committed to the 
 
115  See Valerie C. Brannon, Cong. Research Serv., LSB10172, Can a President Amend 
Regulations by Executive Order? (2018).  
116  5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (1946).  
117  Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796 (1992).  
118  See id.  
119  See Franklin, 505 U.S. at 796 (“We hold that the final action complained of is that of 
the President, and the President is not an agency within the meaning of the Act. 
Accordingly, there is no final agency action that may be reviewed under the APA 
standards.”); Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 465 (1994) (“[T]he President's actions were 
not reviewable under the APA, because the President is not an ‘agency’ within the meaning 
of the APA. . . . [But] the ‘President's actions may still be reviewed for constitutionality.’”); 
Michael Simon Design, Inc. v. United States, 609 F.3d 1335, 1337–38 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  
120  See Franklin, 505 U.S. at 796; Dalton, 511 U.S. at 465.  
121  See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 602 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(reasoning that a federal government’s control that impedes on the local government is an 
unconstitutional blank check; “[s]uch a formulation of federal power is no test at all: it is a 
blank check”).  
122  See Am. Inst. for Int'l Steel, Inc. v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 3d 1335, 1341 (Ct. 
Int'l Trade 2019) (“[T]here has been no change in the legal landscape since Algonquin as 
far as section 232 is concerned.”).  
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President’s discretion by an enabling statute are not subject to review for 
rationality, findings of fact, or abuse of discretion.”123 Moreover, the court 
found that Congress intentionally “precluded an inquiry for rationality, 
fact finding, or abuse of discretion” by excluding any qualifying language 
or standard on the president’s concurrence with the DoC’s findings from 
the Section 232 investigations.124 As such, the CIT rejected the Plaintiffs’ 
claim that Section 232’s lack of judicial review violates the constitutional 
system of checks and balances125 and held that Congress had intended the 
president’s determination to be left to his discretion without judicial 
review.126  
Although the CIT’s analysis is consistent with the findings in 
Algonquin, the CIT neglected to consider an important issue in the 
intelligible principle test: whether the statute leaves the operation of the 
intended legislation to the determination of the president.127 
Notwithstanding the CIT’s findings that Congress intended to allow the 
president to make judgments based on his or her discretion without any 
limitations or qualifications, the question remains whether Congress 
properly outlined the intelligible principle in Section 232 to facilitate the 
accountability of the president’s actions. 
In Yakus, the Supreme Court held that if “Congress has specified the 
basic conditions of fact upon whose existence or occurrence, ascertained 
from relevant data by a designated administrative agency, it directs that its 
statutory command shall be effective.”128 Because the objective of judicial 
review is “to ascertain whether the will of Congress has been obeyed [by 
the President],” the Court reasoned that a statute that clearly outlines the 
boundaries and guidelines of the president’s power is sufficient to 
determine whether he or she complied to Congress’s will.129 Moreover, the 
Court held that a statute with specific guidelines that “are sufficiently 
definite and precise [will] enable Congress, the courts and the public to 
ascertain whether the [president] . . . has conformed to those standards.”130 
 
123  Am. Inst. for Int'l Steel, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 3d at 1343.  
124  Id.  
125  See Complaint, supra note 86, at 1, 19.  
126  See Am. Inst. for Int'l Steel, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 3d at 1343 (“the President's 
determination as to the form of remedial action is a matter ‘in the judgment of the 
President.’”) (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1862(c)(1)(A)(ii)).  
127  See J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 410 (1928) (discussing 
that a delegation is proper if the statute does not leave “the expediency or just operation of 
[] legislation” to the determination of the president.).  
128  Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424–25 (1944).  
129  Id. at 425 (“This depends . . . upon the determination whether the definition 
sufficiently marks the field within which the Administrator is to act so that it may be known 
whether he has kept within it in compliance with the legislative will.”).  
130  Id. at 426.  
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Accordingly, Section 232 may seem self-sufficient without judicial review 
as the Algonquin Court held that the statute broadly outlines the boundaries 
of the president’s actions: he or she can adjust imports for the exclusive 
sake of national security.131 
In practice, however, Section 232 does not plainly set the boundaries 
for presidential power due to the lack of guidance for courts and Congress 
to regulate the executive action. Section 232 fails to meet the preconditions 
laid out in Yakus because it fails to outline: (1) any statutory 
requirement(s) for the president to follow the DoC’s recommendations; (2) 
guidelines on determining the method of remedial measure(s); and (3) 
rationale(s) on selecting the number of rates for the remedial measures.132  
The broad and permissive language of Section 232, which lacks 
“definite and precise” standards, inhibits Congress’s ability to ascertain 
whether the president has complied to Congress’s will.133 It “provides 
virtually unbridled discretion to the [p]resident with respect to the power 
over trade that is reserved by the Constitution to Congress.”134 Although 
the president’s interpretations of the statute—that are plainly unrelated to 
national security—would be subject to judicial review, in theory, 
“identifying the line between regulation of trade in furtherance of national 
security and an impermissible encroachment into the role of Congress 
could be elusive in some cases because judicial review would allow neither 
an inquiry into the [p]resident’s motives nor a review of his fact-
finding.”135  
Without specific boundaries on the president’s exercise of discretion, 
there is potential for presidential abuse of power.136 For example, the 
president could make a decision to impose tariffs on an import that poses 
 
131  See Defendants’ Reply in Support of their Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 
5–6, Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, No. 18-00152 (Ct. Int’l Trade Nov. 9, 
2018).  
132  See Am. Inst. for Int'l Steel, Inc. v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 3d 1335, 1346 (Ct. 
Int'l Trade 2019) (Katzmann, J., dubitante).  
133  See Yakus, 321 U.S. at 425–26.  
134  Am. Inst. for Int'l Steel, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 3d at 1352 (Katzmann, J., dubitante).  
135  Id. at 1344–45 (“One might argue that the statute allows for a gray area where the 
President could invoke the statute to act in a manner constitutionally reserved for Congress 
but not objectively outside the President’s statutory authority, and the scope of review 
would preclude the uncovering of such a truth.”).  
136  See Chapman & McConell, supra note 66, at 1785 (“A certain degree of interpretive 
discretion is inherent in law execution, however precisely crafted, is self-defining with 
respect to all conceivable applications. Yet at a certain point, broad delegations of 
standardless power to the executive strain the understanding that the executive can regulate 
conduct only pursuant to law.”).  
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no facially possible threat to the nation’s security, such as peanut butter.137 
However, Section 232 executive power is untouchable by virtue of its non-
justiciability, which resulted in the courts’ implicit declaration that “the 
discretion claimed by the executive is genuinely rooted in congressional 
delegation.”138  
In American Institute for International Steel, Inc., the Federal Circuit 
must decide whether Section 232 is a permissible delegation of Congress’s 
authority.139 The Federal Circuit should interpret Section 232 under strict 
scrutiny “to ensure that [the] delegation is the genuine intention of 
Congress, and not an instance of executive overreach.”140 
III. THE LEGISLATIVE FIGHT OVER THE SECTION 232 TARIFFS 
Since the enactment of President Trump’s Section 232 Tariffs, both 
Democratic and Republican lawmakers have proposed numerous 
legislative bills to limit the President’s Section 232 authority, though they 
were short-lived.141  
Immediately following the government shutdown in late-January 
2019, however, President Trump and the Section 232 Tariffs became a 
political relevant once again, as both supporters and opponents of the 
tariffs introduced new bills.142 Bi-partisan and non-partisan groups of the 
House and Senate have proposed several bills to curtail the President’s 
authority under Section 232, such as the Global Trade Accountability Act 
of 2019,143 the Bicameral Congressional Trade Authority Act,144 the Trade 
Security Act of 2019,145 the Reclaiming Congressional Trade Authority 
 
137  See Alex Lawson, Trade Court Grapples With Trump’s Security-Based Tariffs, 
Law360 (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1113210/trade-court-grapples-
with-trump-s-security-based-tariffs.  
138  Chapman & McConell, supra note 66, at 1786.  
139  See Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants Am. Inst. For Int’l Steel, Inc., and Sim-Tex, LP, 
Kurt Orban Partners, LLC., supra note 97, at 2.  
140  Chapman & McConell, supra note 66, at 1786.  
141  See Claussen, supra note 68; Jordain Carney, Senate Takes Symbolic Shot at Trump 
Tariffs, THE HILL (July 11, 2018, 1:24 PM), https://thehill.com/blogs/floor-
action/senate/396505-senate-takes-symbolic-shot-at-trump-tariffs; Bryan Koenig, Sens. 
Propose Bipartisan Bill to Curb Trump’s Tariff Powers, LAW360 (Aug. 1, 2018, 7:21 PM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1069273/sens-propose-bipartisan-bill-to-curb-trump-s-
tariff-powers.  
142  See Niquette, supra note 59; Megan Cassella, Lawmakers Prep Bipartisan Bill to 
Curtail Trump’s Tariff Authority, POLITICO (Jan. 25, 2019, 6:44 PM), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/01/25/limit-trump-tarriffs-1120215.  
143  Trade Accountability Act of 2019, H.R. 723, 116th Cong. § 1 (2019).  
144  Bicameral Congressional Trade Authority Act of 2019, H.R. 940, 116th Cong. § 1 
(2019).  
145  Trade Security Act of 2019, H.R. 1008, 116th Cong. § 1 (2019).  
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Act of 2019,146 and the Promoting Responsible and Free Trade Act of 
2019.147 Although these bills vary in their methods of altering Section 232 
authority and are sponsored by different partisan-groups, they all have a 
common objective: to limit the executive power in adjusting imports.148 
The likelihood for one of these bills to pass as law remains hopeful as they 
are supported by both chambers of Congress, along with sponsors from 
the manufacturing and farming industries.149  
Even if one of these bills is enacted under the Trump Administration, 
however, President Trump will likely veto the bill due to his support for 
the United States Reciprocal Trade Act (the “RTA”).150 Introduced by 
Republican lawmakers, the RTA seeks to expand the President’s authority 
to increase tariffs in response to any foreign trade barriers imposed upon 
American products.151 If passed, President Trump would have even wider 
liberty to control trade.152 Thus, President Trump is an avid supporter of 
the RTA and has urged Congress to support this Act.153  
The enactment of any one of these bills will alter Section 232 by either 
curtailing or expanding the President’s trade prerogative to control 
imports. Nevertheless, even if none of these bills becomes law, lawmakers 
will likely persevere to modify Section 232 through repeal or 
amendment.154 A repeal of Section 232 would likely remove the statute’s 
delegation of legislative power to the President, and consequently 
invalidate all Section 232 tariffs, if applied retroactively.155 Although such 
repeal would eliminate this entire issue, President Trump would likely veto 
any potential repeal of Section 232 due to his support for the RTA.  
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Revision of Section 232 is a more realistic options. Therefore, revision 
should be prioritized to establish a compromise for both supporters and 
opponents of the Section 232 Tariffs. For example, Congress may restrict 
the President’s creation of new tariffs by expanding Section 232’s 
exception provision to include additional items or outline countries 
subjected to limitations.156 Analogous to the exception for petroleum 
products, an amendment to Section 232’s exception provision could 
require the president to request for Congress’s approval prior to imposing 
tariffs on particular products or countries.157 Alternatively, Congress may 
amend the broad and permissive language of Section 232 to incorporate 
comprehensive standards on how and what the president can do to adjust 
imports. In the absence of judicial review, these standards will allow the 
people and the nation to determine whether the president has acted within 
the scope of law.158  
IV. CONCLUSION 
The future of Section 232 and the Section 232 Tariffs can be 
determined by either: (1) the pending decision from the Federal Circuit in 
American Institute for International Steel, Inc.; or (2) the enactment of a 
bill to either expand or limit executive power to adjust imports. If a 
legislative bill is not enacted prior to the Federal Circuit’s decision, the 
Federal Circuit will determine the constitutionality of the statute and the 
future of the Section 232 Tariffs. If the Plaintiffs prevail, the court may 
repeal the tariffs and eliminate Congress’s deference in delegating its 
legislative authority to levy taxes and control commerce. Such a decision 
may halt any future executive orders under Section 232 and prevent 
President Trump and future presidents from manipulating the definition of 
national security to use it as a false pretense for the furtherance of personal 
or non-security related objectives.  
Despite President Trump’s portrayal of tariffs as an American victory, 
using tariffs as a negotiation tactic is precarious and should be avoided. 
Trade-related actions that are taken to limit other nations’ power may in 
turn harm the United States. For example, the continuation of the Section 
232 Tariffs is projected to shrink the American economy by increasing the 
price of goods while reducing American exports, thereby decreasing gross 
domestic product by about 0.3% and household income by $580 in 
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2020.159 Moreover, the Section 232 Tariffs have left American citizens 
vulnerable because they are forced to face the consequences of tariffs on 
imports from a sole or dominant exporting country.160 Although President 
Trump intended to limit trading partners’ enrichment from exports to the 
United States, these countries have continued to prosper because they 
increase consumer prices to compensate for the exporting fees.161 
Similarly, American manufacturers and farmers have also confronted 
tariffs imposed by retaliating countries.162  
Although the fate of Section 232 remains ambiguous, the future of the 
statute’s delegation of power remains unobstructed: the United States will 
continue to levy new tariffs, quotas, or other restrictions on a variety of 
imports from numerous trading partners while those countries retaliate by 
issuing comparable or higher rates on American exports. Under the Trump 
Administration, there is no foreseeable ending of the tariff tug-of-war 
unless the Federal Circuit or Congress intervenes to limit Section 232’s 
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